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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SUSAN E. MAXFIELD, as 
Guardian ad Litem for 
LAURIE ANN MAXFIELD, 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Plaintiff and Appellant, IN ANSWER TO PETITION 
FOR REHEARING 
VS. 
KENNETH 0. FISHLER, 
Case No. 13955 
Defendant and Respondent. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a medical malpractice action arising out of the 
alleged failure of the respondent physician to diagnose and 
treat a physical ailment of the appellant infant* 
DISPOSITION ON APPEAL 
The Court affirmed the ruling of the trial court dismissing 
appellant's complaint with prejudice for failure to prosecute 
pursuant to Rule 41(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
Respondent seeks a denial of appellant's petition for 
rehearing. 
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FACTS 
The appellant has failed to state the material facts 
relevant to the Court's decision and a more complete and 
accurate statement is therefore necessary. The parties will 
hereinafter be designated as they appeared in the trial court. 
In its opinion filed on August 1, 1975, this Court 
held that it was not an abuse of discretion to dismiss the 
plaintiff's claim for failure to prosecute when the record 
demonstrates that, due to inexcusable neglect, she was not 
prepared to prove her case on the date of trial. The Court 
found that the plaintiff "was not ready to proceed at the time 
the trial date arrived" and that the record showed that the 
plaintiff or her counsel "had been dilatory in responding to 
defendant's efforts at discovery and had resisted his efforts 
to resolve the issues by getting the case to trial." In light 
of these findings, the Court held that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion and affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff's 
claim. 
The material facts relied upon in the Court's opinion are 
clearly shown in the record on appeal. On the basis of the 
record before it, the Court found that the plaintiff made no 
pretrial effort to discover evidence to support her case that 
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could have been admitted at trial. She did not schedule or 
take a single deposition (R. 14). She did not submit 
interrogatories to elicit information known to Dr. Fishier or 
to discover what testimony or opinions he would be expected 
to give at trial (R. 14). Most importantly, however, the 
record shows that the plaintiff failed to obtain any informa-
tion from medical experts during the pendency of the action 
that tended to prove or support her case. Claiming to have 
been met with "pervasive silence" and antagonism whenever she 
informally consulted physicians, the plaintiff nevertheless 
failed to compel testimony by deposition or by requiring at-
tendance at trial. As a result, the record indicates that 
she and her attorney had no information upon which to rely at 
the time of trial to reasonably anticipate what testimony could 
be elicited by either direct or cross-examination of adverse 
witnesses. 
On the morning of trial, the one medical witness the 
plaintiff had hoped would lend some support to her claim 
did not appear because he had not been notified of the trial 
date, had not been asked to appear, and the plaintiff's attorney 
had failed to serve him with a subpoena (R. 13-14). Thus, the 
plaintiff and her attorney were not only unprepared to proceed 
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by virtue of their inattention to pretrial discovery needs, 
but they were also left without a single medical witness, 
except the defendant, who could offer vital testimony that the 
care offered by Dr. Fishier fell below required professional 
standards and that his treatment proximately caused injury to 
the plaintiff. 
In an attempt to avoid the effect of her neglect, the 
plaintiff sought a continuance which, as plaintiff now concedes, 
was properly denied. 
Viewing all of the circumstances known to the trial court, 
including the absence of any discovery efforts by plaintiff, 
the plaintiff's recalcitrance at each step undertaken by the 
defendant to move the case forward and the absence of any 
indication in the record that the plaintiff or her attorney 
were able to proceed, this Court held that the dismissal of the 
plaintiff's claim was not an abuse of discretion. The plain-
tiff's assertion on appeal that she was capable, prepared and 
willing to proceed on the date of trial was too hollow, too late, 
and too self-serving to be credible. 
In support of her petition for rehearing, the plaintiff 
now asserts, without a single citation to the record or to legal 
authorities, that the Court misunderstood the facts and erred in 
-4~ 
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its judgment in this case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PETITION FOR REHEARING FAILS TO STATE ANY GROUND 
UPON WHICH REHEARING SHOULD BE GRANTED. 
In ancient, but still vital, decisions this Court set 
forth the grounds required to justify a rehearing. In Brown 
v. Pickard, 4 Utah 292, 9 P. 512 (1886), the Court denied a 
petition for rehearing and stated: 
We long ago laid down the rule that, to 
justify a rehearing, a strong case must be 
made. We must be convinced that the court 
failed to consider some material point in 
the case, or that it erred in its conclusions, 
or that some matter has been discovered which 
was unknown at the time of the hearing. 
Where a case has been fully and fairly considered 
in all its bearings, a rehearing will be 
denied. 9 P. at 512 (Citations omitted.) 
Similarly, in the case of Cummings v. Nielson, 42 Utah 
157, 129 P. 619 (1913), the Court in answer to an application 
for rehearing reaffirmed this view and stated: 
When this Court, however, has considered 
and decided all of the material questions 
involved in a case, a rehearing should not 
be applied for, unless we have misconstrued 
or overlooked some statute or decision 
which may affect the result, or that we 
have based the decision on some wrong 
principle of law, or have either misapplied 
-5-
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or overlooked something which materially 
affects the result. 129.P. at 624. 
In the instant case, the petition fails to state any 
material fact that the Court previously overlooked in its 
consideration of the plaintifffs appeal. 
The plaintiff alleges that a nonresident bond was 
purchased on December 29, 1972, but even if relevant to 
the ultimate result on appeal, the fact remains that the 
record contains no indication that the bond was ever filed. 
Similarly, the plaintiff alleges that her counsel, 
despite due diligence,, was unable to answer the defendant's 
seven interrogatories served on March 14, 1974, because she 
had withdrawn the case from her attorney during some 
portion of 1973 (R. 90-91). Nevertheless, these interro-
gatories were not answered until five days prior to trial 
and the plaintiff's attorney did so only after a court 
order had been issued (R. 69-71, 74). 
The allegations contained in the petition relating 
to the plaintiff's attempts to contact medical experts 
are more relevant, but equally insubstantial in justifying 
a rehearing. The Court's opinion correctly states that 
"no medical experts had been deposed or even contacted for 
the purpose of testifying by plaintiff's counsel." Plain-
-6-
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tiff's only challenge to that conclusion is the mere assertion 
that doctors were contacted "regarding the present matter," 
but that they were uncooperative* The fact that medical 
experts did not voluntarily appear on behalf of the plaintiff 
is self-evident, but does not excuse the obligation of 
plaintifffs attorney to secure the testimony needed to prove 
a case. 
Finally, the petition reasserts plaintifffs argument 
made on appeal that she and her attorney were ready, willing 
and able to prosecute their case on the day of the scheduled 
trial. These assertions, however, are wholly unsupported 
by the record and are totally incredible in light of all the 
circumstances. The presence of the plaintiff's parents, 
plaintiff's attorney, completed jury instructions and 
availability of medical records are urged as indicia of this 
intention, but these arrangements were all made prior to the 
date of trial when the plaintiff and her counsel first dis-
covered that they had no expert witness. More importantly, 
however, the Court has already thoughtfully considered and 
correctly rejected these contentions. 
In summary, the plaintiff has failed to raise any 
material fact, statute or decision overlooked by the Court on 
-7~ 
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the original appeal which may affect the result reached 
by this Court. To the contrary, the plaintiff merely seeks 
a reconsideration of the points already decided upon appeal. 
Accordingly, plaintiff's petition for reconsideration should 
be denied. 
POINT II 
THE PETITION FAILS TO CONFORM TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 
THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND, THEREFORE, SHOULD BE 
DENIED. 
The plaintiff's petition for rehearing, in both substance 
and form, is merely a re-argument of the appeal upon its 
merits. Rule 76(e) (1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, sets 
forth the requirements for a petition for rehearing as 
follows: 
The petition shall state briefly the 
points wherein it is alleged that the 
appellate court has erred. The 
petition shall be supported by a 
brief of the authorities relied upon 
to sustain the points listed in such 
petition. 
In Enright v. Grant, 5 Utah 400, 16 P. 595 (1888), 
the Court, in denying a petition for rehearing, called atten-
tion to the precise practice pursued by the plaintiff in 
this case and stated: 
. - 8 - ..'• 
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The petition is an extended and elaborate 
argument in favor of a rehearing. This is 
not in conformity to the rule* The petition 
for rehearing is a pleading, and should not 
be an argument. If points and authorities 
are submitted, they should be in a separate 
instrument, and not as a part of the petition. 
16 P. at 596. 
Inasmuch as the plaintiff has failed to comply with 
these rules and has merely presented a re-argument of the 
appeal, the petition should be denied. In Gershenhorne v. 
Walter R. Stutz Enterprises, 306 P.2d 121 (Nev. 1957), the 
Nevada Supreme Court summarily denied a petition for rehearing 
which failed to conform with requirements identical to those 
applicable in this case. The Court stated: 
With increasing frequency counsel seem to 
be confusing the function of a petition for 
rehearing with the rehearing itself. In 
this case a "petition" of 34 pages has been 
filed by the appellants which, upon patient 
reading, is discovered to be in substance 
a re-argument of the appeal. For this 
reason, rehearing is denied. 306 P.2d at 121. 
The Court has already given thoughtful consideration 
to the points raised by the plaintiff on her original appeal. 
The Court need not and should not grant a rehearing when the 
petition fails to conform with the relevant Rules of Civil 
Procedure and merely re-argues the identical points previously 
considered and resolved on appeal. 
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CONCLUSION 
The plaintiff's petition for rehearing fails to ;•; 
raise any material fact or issue not previously considered 
by the Court at the time of the original hearing and no 
basis whatsoever has been shown upon which error can be 
found. Accordingly, it is patently clear that the plaintiff 
is simply dissatisfied with the judgment of the Court and 
merely seeks another opportunity to re-argue her case by 
petitioning for rehearing. For these reasons, the petition 
clearly lacks merit and should be denied. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WORSLEY, SNOW & CHRISTENSEN 
Seventh Floor, 
Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Stan Rasmussen, being first duly sworn states that 
he personally delivered two copies of the Respondent's Brief 
In Answer To Petition For Rehearing in the matter of 
Maxfield v. Fishier to the offices of Fullmer & Harding, 540 
East 5-00 South, Suite 203, Salt Lake City, Utah.-
\^yfa^ 7\^8^f^c^'Sr^^ 
STAN RASMUSSEN 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 9th day of 
September, 19 75. 
.- V Z7 . 
Notary Public 
Residing in Salt Lake City, Utah 
My Commission Expires: 
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